Thursday 23 June 2011

Life-denying and life-affirming

The terms life-denying or life-affirming could be understood as responses to moral terms such as good/evil. As such the terms can be applied to lots of phenomena [as can the terms good/evil]. An action, a value, a type of character or even a whole culture or political system could be termed life-denying or life-affirming. What makes these things life-denying would be the extent to which they constrain or deny the ability of the person or culture to express its will to power in a healthy way. 


We can see how a living organism could be said to express its will to power, if this is understood biologically as some kind driving force or energy that distinguishes a living from a non-living thing. This interpretation has its problems [for example, how can a culture have a will to power?] but it fits with points made in the text [13,  36, 259]. An organism's will to power could be expressed in terms of the drive to exploit its surroundings in order to flourish by expending its energies; but it could also occur in more morally acceptable ways, such as a drive to artistic creativity or self-expression. What's less clear is how a  Christianity can have a will to power. I guess a Christian culture could be said to irrationally or unnecessarily or unhealthily constrain the self-expression of people who live in/under it [by saying that self-interest is a sin, for example]. And if will to power is a biological term [i.e all life forms must exploit to survive], then it is also relatively clear how a situation could constrain an organism's ability to do this. Although it raises questions about how Nietzsche - or anyone - could decide what counts as genuinely life-denying and life-affirming from outside the organism's perspective. It is when he applies the distinction to psychological ways of expressing a will to power in value judgements [i.e. noble values] that it gets less clear. If the slave types expend their energies in religious worship, then for them, religion isn't life-denying. This surely fits with perspectivism - religion is the perspective of the weak willed. But we cannot make a judgement that religious belief is life-denying as such [i.e. intrinsically life-denying] because it only seems to be life-denying for those people for whom religion is a constraint on their will to power [i.e. the noble artists who shape their lives as artistic acts]. Being anti-religion is an expression of a higher way of life FOR THOSE PEOPLE but not for everyone else. So the distinction life-denying/life-affirming could be said to contradict N's perspectivism, if he means that all values/moralities can be judged using the criterion.

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